Give a little love to ISO

        In this "Zone Blocking" World there has to be a place for a good ole isolation running play.  The weak side run that pits the fullback in a one on one match up with the linebacker. I guess the first thing you have to do is bring back the fullback.  While many of today's offenses include three and four wide receiver sets, some like Auburn Head Coach Gus Malzahn have found creative ways to get a lead blocker in the formation allowing the offense to run more traditional 21 personnel formation based runs like power and iso.
       One of these formations I call "Tulsa" -- a reference to  Malzahn's time spent as

Tulsa Right Formation

offensive coordinator with the Hurricanes.  In this set the offense lines up with three receivers out wide and a hybrid fullback/tight end or "H" lined up offset with the tailback in the base formation.  The great thing about Tulsa is it's a flexible formation that poises the question to defenses  -- is it a run or pass formation?
       As we began to incorporate this formation into our offense at Johnson C. Smith University, it became obvious that we were only scratching the surface.  In Tulsa, the offense has a chance to; overload the strong side, balance or flip the field with motion and get to just about every run in the offensive play book.  Conversely, in a four receiver spread formation, you are virtually locked into running inside or outside zone without shifting or motioning to a different formation.
      Over the years, I found that ISO was a very productive play to run out of Tulsa formation.

Tulsa Right - ISO Weak (Bend)

     We also found a way to run it without tipping our hand quite by accident.  Normally, we would move the tailback and fullback to the side of the run.  One day during inside drill, we lined up in Tulsa with the slot to the right and the tail back and H lined up to the strength as well.

      Our offensive coordinator, Maurice Flowers, called ISO to the left and I started to move the backs to the play side when Coach Flowers said  "Leave them on that side and let's see how they adjust." The first time we ran the play from this alignment, it broke loose. From my vantage point behind the play, I could see that the "Will" linebacker never saw the H until it was too late and we had him out flanked.
     Later as a play caller iso became a bigger part of my run package. I developed and taught some rules that made this play even more effective.  The first rule I gave the lead back whether a true fullback or H was to get to the outside shoulder of the linebacker on the isolation block. This is in direct contrast to what defensive coaches tell their linebackers which is to never give up their outside shoulder. My reason for teaching this was if we got outside leverage on the linebacker, we could hit this play outside the lead block and just inside the block of the offensive tackle who was taught to take a short jab step to the outside. The tackle's step forces the defensive end to widen because his first instinct is to not get reached.
     When the tail back or in some cases the quarterback hits this crease it puts him in a one on one situation with the safety. One missed tackle and he is off to the races.

Panthers, Derek Anderson finds simple solutions to complex problems in opener

        The Carolina Panthers were expected to wilt under the Florida sun and the pressure of losing franchise quarterback Cam Newton against the Tampa Bay Buccaneers. Instead they went on the road and built a 17-0 lead before holding on for a 20-14 win. The first opening day victory for Carolina since the 2008 season.

        One of the keys to the win was the efficient way that back up quarterback Derek Anderson managed first and second downs which translated into manageable third downs especially in the first half. In the second quarter, Anderson lead a gut-busting 15 play, 69 yard drive that took the starch out of the talented Bucs defense.

        Here's an example of a play drawn up by Panthers Offensive Coordinator Mike Shula that lead to one of those big conversions:

       As you can see the Panthers are lined up in a spread formation. Tampa's defense has loaded the box with seven men at the line of scrimmage.  The Bucs have two high safeties and the corners are 7 to 8 yards off the line of scrimmage.      Basically, they are saying we will get to you before you can get the pass off.  I find it a little puzzling that while showing an all out blitz they would show this four deep look on third and only four yards to go.

        Anderson was quick to capitalize. It appeared that the veteran audibled into a play that included two quick hitting concepts on each side - one designed to beat cover two or four and one designed to beat cover-3.

       On the boundary side, the Panthers ran a concept I call "flash". In this combination,

Rookie wide receiver Kelvin Benjamin runs a square in or slant and tight end Greg Olsen runs an out route from the inside.  This is a good concept to  run versus a one high safety defense look with the corner walked off. In that case, the quarterback reads the alley defender. If the alley defender normally a safety or linebacker chases the flat route which should be his responsibility the quarterback would throw to the slant. If he drops into the slat window, then the quarterback throws to the flat.

      Because the Bucs are two hi defensive set up Anderson decided to work the the far

side of the play, where wide receivers Jason Avant and Jerricho Cotchery were running a concept I call "basic".  Basic includes a go route on the outside and an out route from the inside.  This quick game read is good against a two hi defensive set because it forces the corner to make a decision to drop with the vertical or release the vertical route and attack the flat. In this case, the corner dropped to protect against the vertical voiding the flat.  The safety who was covering the slot receiver from depth had no chance to stop the 5 yard gain that was good enough for a first down.

Give me a choke point!

      One of my least favorites sights is eleven defenders flowing over top of any run to the outside -- on pitch or outside zone.  I always complained that when the running back gets to the so-called edge the same 7 or 8 defensive players that were in front of him at the snap are still in front of him.
      Our answer to that was to provide one or more "choke" points along the line of scrimmage. This was accomplished by having at least one fold (blocker block back) or crack on the play allowing another lineman to wrap around and rise to the second level.
       At Johnson C. Smith,  I pestered OC Maurice Flowers so much for the "crack" that he named it after me.  
       The logic of the choke point is simple - to give atleast one lineman a gimme block that will stop the flow of one defender and possibly pick up some more defenders in the wash.  Here are a couple examples of how we establish that choke point:

1) Center/Guard fold on zone run to the strength - As you see in this example, we are
running zone stretch to the right. The play side guard and tackle take their zone step and work to the outside shoulder of the defensive tackle (T)  and end (A).  Most defensive linemen will do everything they can to prevent this and this will widen the play side naturally.  The center provides the choke point by blocking back on the nose tackle (N). This accomplishes a couple things: First it allows the left guard to pull around and rise up to the second level to block the linebacker (M). It also prevents the backside defensive end front flying down the line of scrimmage in pursuit without having to work around the center's block.  Because the mike is likely to flow with the run action there is very little chance that the guard will overtake him.  That's all right because the choke will create a natural crease in front seven and once the running back sticks his foot in the ground and attacks the crease  the guard should be in perfect position to kick the linebacker to the outside. 

2) The old "Green Bay Packer Sweep" - if it was good enough for Lombardi it is certainly good enough for me.  For years I kept hearing the voice of the all-time great coach in my head extolling - "We want a seal here, and a seal here, and we will run in the alley!"  My foundation for teaching this to today's players came from Coach Joey Sulkowski who was offensive coordinator my first year at JCSU. The simple rule he taught to the offensive line was -- if you're covered pull and if you are uncovered block down.  As you can see in this example in a Pro formation that provides two choke points and allows both guards to pull. On key to running in the alley is the seal provided by the tight ends down block. I instruct tight ends to make sure that they don't must protect the gap first and then prevent the end from escaping over the top.  I the right set (two high safeties with only seven in the box) the lead block by the fullback can really help set up a big play.  in this case, he must "scrape to safety picking up a linebacker that flows over the top.  If this is a constant problem, we would add a crack on the alley defender and allow the fullback to kick the corner.

What I Believe -- It's All About the Numbers

     Several years ago, University of Virginia Head Coach Mike London, a former college teammate, challenged me to produce some X's and O's videos which would represent my beliefs as a football coach and serve as a resume tape of sorts.  At the time, I had just finished my first year as an unpaid part-time assistant coach at Johnson C. Smith University.  
     The most important thing that I had learned up to that point was exactly what I didn't know.  A very humbling prospect for someone who had been around football his whole life but as coaches know there is a difference between being in the stands and in the coach's meeting room.
     What I believed, especially on the offensive side of the ball, was about to change thanks to the arrival of offensive coordinator Maurice Flowers in my second year.  The former JCSU quarterback and very successful high school head coach opened my eyes to the possibility that as an offense we would dictate to the defense the number of players in the "Box."
     One day in practice, the defense ran a blitz off the weak side edge and the running back ran right by him and went into the flats. I yelled at the running back to not bypass the blitzer. Coach Flowers interrupted at said, "Coach he is more useful to me in the pattern than staying in to block." I replied, "Who's going to block the blitzer?"  He answered, "Let them figure out who is going to cover the running back."
     As I look back that was a watershed moment in my development as a coach and later as a play caller.
     The funny thing is that in my years of covering the NFL as an analyst, something always bothered my about the "hat on a hat" rule.  The belief is that you keep in enough blockers to block the equal amount of potential blitzers.  How many times have you seen NFL teams take a running back and tight end and keep them in to block in maximum protection.
     The thing I learned from Flowers was that if your response to the threat of a blitz is to take receivers out of the pattern, you are only helping the defense by reducing the threat.
     When I took over a offensive coordinator at Phillip O. Berry High School in 2012, I became a creature of managing the box count -- always looking for ways to force defenders into coverage instead of lurking around the line of scrimmage.

     It's simple math: Let's say you line up with five offensive linemen and a tight end (11 personnel).  The defense will put seven in the box - four down linemen and three linebackers and some cases eight by walking down a safety.
     Now, if we were using the hat on a hat philosophy and brought a receiver into the box for added protection the defense would just add another defender to the box and still out number the offense. Eventually it would be nine on 11 (not counting the running back and quarterback).  I say that with tongue in cheek but the truth is using that rule the defense is always going to win the box count.
     Here's a very simple approach we used to force the defense's hand at Berry. If we lined up in spread formation and a defense did not cover the number two receiver (L) as in the example below. The quarterback was required to take the snap and throw him the ball.  As you can see in this example, the linebackers are inside to protect against the run.

     We forced defenses to honor the outside receiver and move a linebacker out of the box to protect against the short throw. In my second year, our quarterback really began to exploit the uncovered receiver rule even more and we averaged over 9.5 yards every time we made the quick throw.
     In my opinion, this just became and extension of the running game because if a team overloaded the box to stop the run, we were almost guaranteed a first down.  Look at it this way, if there were a run play that averaged almost 10 yards - how many times would you run it?
     Clemson offensive coordinator Chad Morris used this very play in their 2014 bowl game against Ohio State, throwing the ball to Sammy Watkins time after time when the Buckeyes left him uncovered or tried to cover him from depth with a safety.  When I asked Morris what his thoughts were on the play, he said with a smile, "That we didn't run it enough during the season."
      The only way defenses can stop the quick throw is to move a linebacker out of the box and cover the outside receivers. As a offensive line coach who calls plays that's exactly what I want.
      With the box count "lighter", we can be more successful in our run game.  Here's an example of our inside run play which uses zone-help rules to block the remaining defenders in the box. This play provides some nice lanes for our running back to be successful.      
     Eventually, this becomes a cat and mouse game with defensive coordinators who look for ways to cheat the box - having defenders play half way out on the slot or lining up on the slot and bringing the linebackers hot of the edge versus run and pass.  Then that question comes up again -- who is going to cover our receiver?

Coach Craft
      

In A Bind: Kansas City Head Coach Andy Reid is a master at putting defensive players in a no-win situation.

FORMATION:

      The Chiefs are lined up in 12 personnel - one running back and two tight ends. To make this harder to decipher, they put the two receivers spread opposite the two tight ends. This created what I like to call a "nub" side. Formations like this, force defensive coordinators to make a choice - play the nub side for the run or stay in a balanced defensive set that accounts for the 2 by 2 passing set.
As you can see in this case, Panthers Defensive Coordinator Sean McDermott, who ironically worked for Reid in Philadelphia, moved his corners to the two receiver side to provide the best match ups.  In addition he lined up of his safeties over the number two receiver to protect against any deep threat.
                That left weak side linebacker Jason Williams (54) and safety Robert Lester (38) to the nub side to protect against a run to the boundary and also cover any pass combination involving the two tight ends that I will designate (H) and (U).

It is also worth noting that the tight end on the ball (H) was detached and the other tight end (U) lined up inside but off the ball.  This will comes into play when the Chiefs put him in motion.

MOTION:

Before the snap, the Chiefs used a simple motion to probe the Panthers coverage.  The tight end off the line (U) motioned across the formation and back.

At that point, the quarterback knew he was facing zone coverage since the Panthers defenders did not adjust to the motion. Now it was game on.

Just before the snap the (U) completed his yo-yo and at the snap burst towards the side line before wheeling up field on a vertical route.

It's that split second of indecision for the defense that's so critical to the success of the play. Who covers this apparent threat to the flat?  This is the main reason I prefer speed motion over shifts that allow the defense a chance to sort out coverage and make adjustments.

Normally, in this situation the outside linebacker would have responsibility for the flat or curl/flat.  The safety would then have responsibility for the deep half of the field. The magic of the motion is that it forces the defenders to choose between threat and responsibility.

If they make the wrong decision and even move a couple steps out of position that's all the offense needs to capitalize.

BIND:

In this case, the safety took several steps toward the (U) who was now running uncovered. The (H) delayed slightly before running his vertical into the safety's "ghost" (voided area). When the safety realized he was out of position it was too late. The chiefs quarterback delivered a strike and the (H) was on his way to the end zone.

Coach Craft